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Terence loll 
tlThe last few years were among the most difficult we 
have experienced and called for sacrifices by one and 
all. But that those sacrifices were worth it is clear 
now: the economic tide has turned towards grovth and 
development fmd we can justifiably look ahead with new 
confidence . 
l#.. overpowering economic and political forces (have) 
combined to produce a comprehensive structural crisis 
for the apartheid economy ... That there is no hope 
for the apytheid economy is now no longer in 
question. 
Introduction 
The South African economy has performed poorly in recent years. One line of 
interpretation views this poor performance as a severe and unfortunate cyclical 
down-swing, from which the economy is slowing r covering. Another, by contrast, 3 
regards it as symptomatic of an economic crisis ; many variations between these 
views can be found. This is, of course, an ideologically loaded issue, since the 
t+mishapf* position is associated with the South African government, and the "crisis" 
view with its left-wing opponents, who foresee national economic recovery only once 
significant economic and political restructuring of society has taken place. 
I shall begin by describing the recent economic record of South Afr'ica, 
putit into a post-War context, and draw out some causes of the current decline. I 
will then consider whether the causes of decline are temporary/cyclical, or long- 
term, whether they are likely to weaken or worsen, and how the decline as a whole 
should be characterized. 
The South African Economy Since World War I1 
To understand the economic prospects of Soykh Africa, it is useful to examine its 
overall record since the Second World War. From the 1940s until 1974, an 
increasingly open and buoyant world economy, with high demand for South African raw 
materials, created ideal conditions for steady growth in the real Gross Domestic 
Product (see Graph 1). Foreign exchange earned was used to import capital 
equipment, and build up local manufacturing and technology behind tariff barriers. 
In the social sphere, vigorous state policies were designed to disorganize African 
workers and keep African wage levels low. While all sectors of the South African 
economy grew over this perid, three overall tendencies were particularly 
significant: 
Firstly, agriculture and mining, the foreign exchange-earning sectors of 
the economy, grew relatively slowly. Their shares of real output fell slightly, and 
of employment more quickly (with an abaolute fall in agricultural employment). 
Secondly, the other goods-producing sectors (manufacturing, electricity, and 
construction) grew more rapidly than the economy as a whole, and their shares of 
employment a l s o  grew steadily.  Thirdly, output and employment i n  the  t e r t i a r y  
sectors  (especial ly government) grew s teadi ly ,  with employment probably contracting 
only i n  the  personal services sector  ( l ed  by domestic service) .  
Since the  ear ly  1970s the  s i tua t ion  has changed markedly. Whereas i n  the  
1960s the Gross Domestic Product of South Africa grew f a s t e r  than t h a t  of  the 
average mid le-income developing country, it has fa i l ed  t o  keep pace with the r e s t  k! 
s ince  then. There has been a steady slow-down i n  r a t e s  of  economic growth s ince  
1974: r e a l  GDP growth r a t e s  have f a l l e n  t o  1.5 per cent i n  the  1980s. Growth r a t e s  
have diminished unevenly through the  economy, however. Owing t o  r i s i n g  and e r r a t i c  
world gold prices,  mining earnings have boomed, while agr icul ture  and manufacturing 
have struggled; s ince  1982, r e a l  manufacturing output and employment have been 
growing more slowly than the economy a s  a whole. The t e r t i a r y  sector  has continued 
growing, led  chief ly  by government. Growth r a t e s  of formal jobs over the  business 
cycle peaked i n  the  1960s and have been f a l l i n g  since (see below). 
Three Determinants of Economic Development i n  South Africa 
Three centra l  determinants of South Africa 's  economic record can be ident i f ied:  the 
balance of payments, the performance of the  manufacturing sector ,  and the employment 
s i tuat ion.  Firs t ly ,  the  balance of payments has always been a po ten t i a l  constraint  
on growth i n  South Africa. Compared t o  most developing countries,  however, South 
Africa has an unusually strong balance of payments s i tuat ion.  The usual pattern is 
of a t rade  surplus produced by raw materials  (agriculture and mining) exports, much 
of which is ltconsumed" by indus t r i a l  sec tors  being n e t  users of foreign exchange, 
and large  invis ib les  d e f i c i t s  ( i n t e r e s t  payments, royal t ies ,  e t c ) .  Capital inflows 
a t t rac ted by high p r o f i t  r a t e s  have a l s o  been an in termit tent  source of savings and 
foreign exchange. 
On the  exports s ide ,  South Africa 's  posit ion has not  changed much post- 
War. South African exports have always comprised mainly r a w  materials, a small 
number of which come t o  a high share of t o t a l  exports; the  mining share i n  
merchandise exports has averaged over 60 per cent. In imports terms, South Africa 
has been largely se l f -suff ic ient  i n  consumer goods since the  1950s. The share of 
imported cap i t a l  goods has r i sen  s ince  1945, however, with machinery and transport  
equipment, f o r  example, reaching 49 per cent  of the imports t o t a l  i n  1985. Hence, 
although South Africa has b u i l t  up a capital-goods industry, the strong h i s to r i ca l  
value of the  rand has permitted imported machinery t o  form a high proportion of  
cap i t a l  goods used. A s  a r e s u l t ,  balance of payments d e f i c i t s  have always tended t o  
b i t e  during boom periods i n  South Africa, w i t h  imports r i s i n g  sharply, necessi tat ing 
an eventual economic clamp-down and monetary contraction. 
After 1971, the  in ternat ional  gold pr ice  (which had been nominally 
constant i n  US dol lars  and f a l l i n g  i n  r e a l  terms since 1949) began r i s ing ,  a l b e i t  
e r ra t i ca l ly .  This boosted mining revenues, eased South Af r i ca t s  balance of payments 
constraint ,  and implied potent ia l ly  higher domestic output growth r a t e s  if  the ext ra  
income were t o  be used productively. The gold "bonanza" was squandered, however, 
and not used t o  extend South Africa's productive capacity s ignif icant ly .  So, when 
the gold pr ice  f e l l  i n  the 19808, the  economy was suddenly weakened, with an 
exchange r a t e  under pressure, a weakened manufacturing sector ,  and high foreign 
debts. 
The vulnerabil i ty of South Africa's balance of payments is revealed i n  two 
main areas. F i r s t ly ,  her current  account is r e l i a n t  on r a w  material  exports and 
imports of  manufactures. Non-gold n e t  ba r t e r  terms of t r ade  - the  r a t i o  of  export 
prices t o  import pr ices  - remain s t a b l e  during in ternat ional  booms but deter iora te  
during slumps. Further, her export earnings tend t o  be e r r a t i c ,  dependent on 
variable in ternat ional  raw material pr ices  and agr icul tura l  f luctuations.  Gold was a 
s t ab i l i z ing  fac to r  u n t i l  the ear ly  19708, but  r e a l  gold earnings have fluctuated 
wildly s ince  - though on a strongly upward long-run trend. 
Secondly, the  t rade  and c a p i t a l  accounts of the  South African balance of 
payments have been opened up s ince  the  l a t e r  1970s, with s t a t e  moves towards a 
. 
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and erratic interest rates, a more open balance of payments designed to encourage 
international trade and capital flows, and a floating and fluctuating exchange rate. 
This had two important effects: South African banks and the state raised foreign 
loans at (then) low real interest rates, which are now being repaid at much higher 
real rates, and allowed an important role for destabilizing short-term capital 
flows. These have rendered the South African economy, balance of payments and 
foreign exchange situation far more vulnerable to vicissitudes in the international 
economy in the 19808, and also make it an easier target for sanctions. 
A second important determinant of the long-run pro perity of the South 8 African economy is the vitality of her manufacturing sector. South African real 
manufacturing output grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, growth rates averaging 
over seven per cent per m u m  (see Graph 2 above). There wereseveral reasons for 
these high growth rates: buoyant international demand and stable terms of trade, an 
active state import-substitution policy, and intervention in strategic economic 
sectors, cheap raw material and electricity inputs, capital controls compelling 
higher levels of local investment, and low black wages. 
The record has negative aspects, however. The import-substitution 
programme combined with the strong currency led to a failure to export. 
International non-competitiveness of local production was accordingly entrenched via 
failure to achieve economies of scale and compete on international markets. 
Likewise, the industrial sector came to rely on protection and ever more advanced 
machinery imports, without the achievement of the full learning effects of producing 
a variety of capital goods for local use and for export. 
Real manufacturing import levels as percentage of GDP failed to fall over 
the years, as South Africa moved I1uplf the imports scale, requiring increased inputs 
of imported machinery, transport equipment and technology to keep industry going. 
The lteasyl1 stage of import substitution in local consumer goods, some durables and 
simpler machinery was basically complete by the early 1970s, with further scope for 
import-replacement limited to capital and intermediate goods and high-technology 
sectors. 
In the 1970s, manufacturing growth began to slow, and rather half-hearted 
government efforts at stimulating exports and the processing of primary products 
have not been effective. The recent record has been particularly poor; according 
to the South African Reserve Bank, manufacturing volume of production in 1986 was 
10.3 per cent below its 1981 peak. The manufacturing sector has begun to contract 
relative to other sectors (its share of real GDP had fallen from a high of 25.5 per 
cent in 1981 to 22.3 per cent in 19851, with inefficiencies and a limited internal 
market restricting local sales, and a strong exchange rate of the rand (until 1984) 
and trade sanctions limiting export growth. This is particularly unfortunate for an 
economy at South Africa's stage of development, as it implies slower future growth 
rates for the economy as a whole. 
Thirdly, a major indicator of the health of any economy is the extent to 
which it can provide employment and incomes to its labour force. In these terms, 
South Africa's performance was impressive until the early 1970s. Employment in most 
of the formal, high productivity sectors of the economy grew steadily, with 
employment growth rates of 3.3 per cent per annum between 1964 and 1974 in those 
sectors for which more reliable official data is available (see Graph 3). African 
open unemployment rates seem not to have risen in the 1960s. Since then, the 
position has deteriorated drastically. Employment growth rates have fallen sharply 
in the past ten years, averaging only about one per cent per annum over the 
1980-1984 cycle. At the same time, African population and labour-force growth rates 
have remained high, leading to a large and continually expanding p003 of labour 
which is "surplus1' to the needs of the modern sector of the economy. 
To make the situation worse, the tendency since 1974 has been for 
industrial firms to increase capital use and labour productivity levels, rather than 
employment. This tendency is particularly noticeable in manufacturing, where output 
and employment growth rates averaged 2.9 per cent per m u m  and only 0.8 per cent 
per m u m ,  respectively, over the 1974-1984 period. Commercial agriculture has been 
mechanizing and shedding labour since the 19606, the mining sector cannot be relied 
on to expand employment greatly, and construction employment seems unlikely to grow 
quickly. Commerce and private services not driven by a dynamic goods sector of the 
economy are unlikely to grow rapidly and raise worker incomes much. Rising 
government employment, on the other hand, is often of entirely unproductive 
bureaucrats, and constrained by a weak state fiscal position. In short, the 
employment outlook is bleak, and government efforts at stimulating the informal 
sector and.labour-intensive employment are not likely to reverse employment trends. 
Together, these employment trends have important implications. 
Unemployment and underemployment are likely to rise rapidly in the foreseeable 
future, as a rapidly growing labour force encounters a stagnant employment position 
in the economy. Increasing economic and social differentiation may emerge within 
the labour force, between people in high productivity, higher income jobs and the 
unemployed or underemployed. The services will be the main source of employment 
growth, led by petty trade and personal services, and the share in total employment 
of low productivity, low income casual workers and the self-employed will probably 
rise further. 
Mishap or Crisis? 
Various causes of South Africa's economic decline8since about 1974, and especially 
in the last six years, have been discussed above. Some are of a temporary or 
cyclical nature, most importantly those induced by vicissitudes in the world 
economy. These have forced many developing economies with structural similarities 
to South Africa to adjust to factors like falling raw materials prices, high 
interest payments on foreign debt, and short-term capital outflows. Some Latin 
American countries, far example, suffered far more from these adjustments than South 
Africa; over the crucial 1981-1985 period, South Africa grew at around one per cent 
per annum, compared to dispter in countries like Argentina (-2.1 per cent) and 
Venezuela (-1.3 per cent). 
The South African economy has, in fact, adjusted relatively quickly to 
these ltexternallt constraints, and most of its short-run weaknesses are being brought 
under control. As of early 1988, inflation rates were falling, the real exchange 
rate of the rand had recovered somewhat from its 1984-85 slump, foreign debts were 
steadily being paid off (using large current account surpluses of the balance of 
payments), and in some sectors signs of recovery were evident. Further, state 
macro-economic policy has begun turning away from the suicidal monetarist (high 
interest rates, free financial and other markets) policies of 1984-85, and the 
economy has begun making structural adaptations such that it should in the fliture be 
less vulnerable to changes in world economic conditions. 
The most immediate danger is still the vulnerability of the balance of 
payments, but gold, uranium and coal exports will continue to provide valuable 
foreign exchange, and more cunning state balance of payments policy could enable the 
economy to benefit more from these earnings than in the recent past. This would be 
the case especially when the bulk of foreign debts have been paid off, reducing the 
necessity for large balance of payments surpluses, and inflation is seen as being 
under control. 
To a significant extent, then, the poor economic performance of 1981-86 
can be seen as 'a "mishap1', as induced by an unfortunate coincidence of events which 
is unlikely to be repeated. But this is not the whole story. While the magnitude 
of the recent slump was magnified by external factors, the South African economy has 
been on a low-growth development path since the mid-1970s. Further, there are 
indications that the current political situation is having a pm-ticularly negative 
effect on the South African economy, on a scale not hitherto experienced. 
Two major political-economic connections can be hypothesized in South 
Africa. Firstly, political ltunrest" tends to lower investment levels and induce 
capital flight and balance of payments crises, leading to deflationary macro- 
economic policies, and slower economic growth. The logic seem simple: investors 
fear profits will be undermined by continual political struggle, with the added 
danger of possible eventual expropriation or nationalization of their investment 
under a radical government. To this can be added pressures on foreign firms 
operating in South Africa, owing to increasing anti-apartheid feeling in the West. 
Thus, real economy-wide growth rates of fixed capital stock of around 6.8 per cent 
per annum 1969-1974 have slowed down to 4.6 per cent 1980-84 - a period in which the 
capita1:output ratio rose by around two per cent per annum and is likely to increase 
in the future. This decline is even more noticeable in manufacturing, with a 
comparable drop from 8.3 per cent to 4 per cent. 
These patterns have been particularly noticeable in South Africa since the 
1984/85 stage of Black resistance. The balance of payments suffered first, and real 
gross domestic fixed investment has fallen steadily since a peak in 1981 (halving in 
manufacturing by 1986), and real net domestic investment by private farms in 1985 
and 1986 was negative, for the first time in South Africa's history! 
Secondly, in the early post-War period, the apartheid system may have 
aided economic growth in South Africa. Its fiscal costs were low and it encouraged 
rapid capital accumulation by ensuring a cheap, unskilled labour supply for White 
firms. By the late 19608, this position had begun changing. The production pattern 
in the economy as a whole was moving increasingly towards higher-wage skill and 
capital-intensive sectors which are less dependent for survival on cheap, unskilled 
Black labour, and the labour controls they suffered prevented the dissemination of 
skills and hampered productivity growth. 
At the same time, the recent fiscal costs of apartheid half soared in 
areas like defence, homelands, administration, and black education. The net 
effect of these processes is that the total financial costs of apartheid are rising 
steadily in a period when the state can ill afford them, thus compelling it to raise 
taxes or loans to cover spending, or reduce expenditure in other areas. This, 
perhaps irreversible, combination of falling benefits and rising costs of apartheid 
over an extended period of time is unique to the current phase of South African 
history. 
The South African economy has endured such a severe slump recently that 
any increase in demand is likely to raise output and employment, and investment 
levels will partially recover from the doldrums. However, such expansion is likely 
to be cut short owing to the slow growth of aggregate productive capacity in the 
1980s, and the inflexibilities and costs associated with the apartheid economy can 
only rise further. Extrapolating recent economic trends in South Africa, it seems 
unlikely that total output will grow faster than perhaps two per cent per annum over 
the next decade, and real incomes per capita are likely to fall stead@. Growth 
projections for the 1986-1990 period of 3.2 or 3.3 per cent per annum seem 
unrealistically high. 
The long-term prospects of the South African economy under the present 
regime are also unpromising. For a developing country, the structure of the economy 
is not healthy - most noticeable in the weak manufacturing sector, in South Africa's 
appalling recent job-creation record, in a weak state finance position (affecting 
investment in infrastructure and parastatals), and in the relatively poor 
performance of employment-creating, small-scale manufacturing and services over the 
past few years. Meanwhile, the world economy is growing only slowly, and has begun 
moving away from some of South Africa's raw material exports. South Africa will 
attempt to export manufactures, but faces stiff competition from other newly 
industrializing countries, and may be hamstrung by looming trade sanctions. 
Further, foreign capital and finance are increasingly suspicious of the South 
African situation, and South Africa will be forced to survive largely without new 
inflows of foreign capital. This is likely to reduce the long-run growth rate by at 
least two per cent per m u m ,  fgpecially if accompanied by diminished access to 
foreign technology and skills. 
In short, then, neither of the extreme positions quoted initially seems 
correct. The South African economy is in a bad way - suffering what may be termed a 
secular recession. None the less, this need not imply economic "crisis" and a 
forthcoming restructuring of accumulation processes in South Africa. The economic 
basis of white rule, while undergoing long-term decline, will certainly be able to 
provide comfortable incomes for most whites, and support a huge military-apartheid 
apparatus for a long time yet. The economy has certain strengths - a strong food- 
producing sector, valuable mineral resources, a limited dependence on oil, a fairly 
developed manufacturing sector, some local technological know-how, and fair levels 
of local savings - which will enable it certainly to e v e ,  and perhaps grow 
slowly, as long as effective large-scale trade sanctions are not applied. 
Likewise, in broad political terms, the South African state's capacity to 
spend its way out of trouble in order to stabilize itself has become increasingly 
constrained by the poor overall economic climate, and its weak fiscal position. 
However, the argwnent that a 'lweakerl' and more isolated economy will undermine the 
government's fiscal position, thus creating space for mass resistance, is 
questionable as it stands. Compared to countries like South Korea, Peru, and 
Zimbabwe, a relative$3 low proportion of government spending in South Africa is on 
the police and army. In times of real crisis, the state response to declining 
revenues would more likely be to lower spending on education, health, and welfare, 
followed by reducing infrastructural and homelands spending, while raisin% 
expenditure on the military and police - suicidal in the long run, perhaps, but a 
strategy quite capable of overcoming any short-run military and civil threat. 
Towards a Laager Economy? 
The South African economy is weakening slowly, but its resilience and capacity to 
adjust to changed circumstances should not be underestimated. Indeed, this could be 
put to the test over the next few years. Under the impact of sanctions and external 
vulnerability, there have been moves amongst South African economic policy-makers 
towards a "laager economy": reducing economic links with the outside world and 
attempting to become economi~gLly more self-sufficient - and hence freer from 
outside political pressures. This makes a virtue of necessity, for South Africa 
can no longer rely on foreign capital inflows, and some trade links are threatened. 
Instead, the local manufacturing sector will be relied on to provide the necessary 
machinery, capital goods and technology to keep the economy and military 
establishment functioning, perhaps with higher parastatal spending or vigorous 
investment incentives to raise investment in vital manufacturing sub-sectors. 
The laager direction would further entrench economic decline in South 
Africa. Most obviously, inefficiency and clumsy government intervention in the 
economy would be perpetuated, raising production costs and lowering output growth 
rates in many economic sectors. In some industrial sectors, capital-intensive 
methods of production would be further entrenched, and dependence on erratic mining 
revenues would remain. Corresponding to this would be low rates of formal . 
job-creation and steadily rising unemployment in all sectors and regions of South 
Africa, and generally falling real incomes. 
This llbacks-to-the-wall" option could have ominous political implications. 
Among Whites, a lengthy period of economic decline, with White morale bolstered by 
nationalism, anti-Communist feeling and state propaganda, might strengthen 
conservative groups and weaken the position of those who want to see an end to the 
system of White political supremacy. Such an economic and political environment 
would render progressive political organization among Blacks even more difficult 
than at present. In the absence of major new political initiatives, however, the 
resilience of the South African economy could allow such a situation to be 
perpetuated formany years, 
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